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Summary findings
Since the 1970s, commodity prices have fallen in  The asymmetric response, which has been attributed  to
international markets at the same time that consumer  trade restrictions and rising processing costs, appears to
prices have risen. The price of coffee declined 18 percent  be caused largely by the behavior of international trading
on world  markets between 1975 and  1993, for example,  companies. Many of these companies are large enough to
but the consumer price for it increased 240 percent in  dominate most commodity markets. Surprisingly,
the United States. Explanations for such diverging  although mainstream economists have suggested
patterns remain largely unexplored  in current economic  imperfect competition in international trade at both the
literature.  producer and the consumer levels, they have not yet
Morisset examines the spreads between international  pointed it out at the intermediary level. Free trade
and domestic commodity prices, explains why they have  requires that all players "sing the same tune":
increased, and analyzes their implications for  competition.
commodity-exporting countries. He finds that the  Morisset recommends a special effort to understand
spreads have increased dramatically because of the  the determinants of consumer prices and the role of
asymmetric response of domestic consumer prices to  intermediaries at both wholesale and retail levels -
movements in world prices. In all major consumer  starting with the collection of information  about the
markets, decreases in world commodity prices have  activities of international trading companies. This effort
systematically been transmitted to domestic consumer  would require the involvement of the World Bank and
prices much less than have increases. This may have cost  the World Trade Organization, because they have the
commodity-exporting countries more than $100 billion a  resources to undertake  such an operation worldwide.
year because it has limited the expansion of demand for  Only a better understanding of how these companies
commodities in these markets.  operate will remove the suspicion of unfair trade in
international  commodity markets.
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2Introduction
Since the 1  970s, commodity prices have fallen in international markets. During the
same time, however, prices for consumers in industrial countries have risen.  For example, the
price of coffee declined by 18 percent on world markets but increased by 240 percent for
consumers  in the United States between 1975 and 1993.  Such diverging patterns can be
generalized across a wide sample of commodities and countries; from crude oil to coffee;
from Italy to the United States, but remain largely unexplored in the current economic
literature.
This paper looks at the spreads between international and domestic commodity prices,
then explains why these spreads have increased and analyzes their implications for
commodity exporting countries. The main finding is that the spreads have increased
dramatically because of the asymmetric response of domestic consumer prices to movements
in world prices.  In all major consumer markets, decreases in world commodity prices have
been systematically much less transmitted than increases to domestic consumer prices.  This
asymmetric response, which has been attributed to trade restrictions and bidding processing
costs. appears rather to be largely caused by the behavior of international trading companies.
The role of these companies merits greater attention.  WVhile  more evidence is still needed, I
nevertheless show that manv of these companies are large enough to have a dominant position
on most commodity markets. Whatever the reason for the increasing spreads, their impact has
been great: they may have cost commodity exporting countries over US$100 billion a year
because they have limited the expansion of the final demand for these products in the major
consumer markets.
This paper argues that a special effort should therefore be made to understand the
determinants of the price of each of the consumer goods associated with commodities. This
effort should include the collection of information on international trading companies. despite
their general protectiveness. in order to improve transparency and competition in these
markets.  Economists should also attempt to integrate intermediaries, a subject that remains
largely ignored by the mainstream literature, in the international trade theory. Ultimately,
only a better understanding of these companies will remove the suspicion of unfair trade in
international commodity markets.
3The paper proceeds as follows.  In the first section, empirical evidence on the
evolution of the spreads between world and domestic consumer prices is provided for several
commodities over the past 25 years. A discussion of the data used throughout the paper is
also included in this section. The second section is devoted to the relationship between world
and domestic prices using a time-series analysis.  Special attention is given to the asymmetric
response of domestic prices to variations in world prices.  The explanations for this behavior
range from trade restrictions to the role of international trading companies, which are
reviewed in the third section.  The fourth section presents a simple partial model that
illustrates some of the potential negative implications arising from the increase in the spreads
over the past two decades.  The last section contains concluding remarks and possible
directions for future research.
I.  Commodity Markets: Measuring thte Variations in Spreads between  World and
Domestic  Consutmer Prices
Consumers in industrial markets can easily observe that prices of coffee, rice, beef,
and gasoline have increased almost continuously over the past two decades.  When these
prices have declined, it has only been because of the short-term corrections to episodes such
as the oil price shocks in the 1  970s.  This generalized increase in consumer prices can be
contrasted with the declining long-term trend of world commodity prices; for example, the
World Bank's non-fuel commodity index declined by 1  1 percent in nominal dollars or 42
percent in constant dollars between 1980 and 1994.2 It is not surprising, therefore,  to find
that the spread between the international and domestic commodity prices increased
dramatically during this period. This section shows, first, how to measure the variations in
these spreads and then gives the results for a sample of commodities and countries over the
period from 1970 to 1994.
The variations in the spread between world and domestic consumer prices can be
measured by the following standard equation (expressed in log-variations):
(1)  Alijj = Apij - A(ejp*i)
Source: "Commodity Markets and the Developing Countries", World Bank Quarterly, February 1996.
4where Aijj is the variation in the spread (or markup) associated with product i in country  j, pj
the domestic consumer price of product i in country j, ej the nominal exchange rate
(dollar/local currency) in country j, and p*j the world price of commodity i.  Domestic
consumer prices rather thafi producer prices are used to capture the final demand for these
products.  Equation (1) reflects the evolution of the spread over time, but it does not provide
information on its size at any given point in time.  The variations in the spread can be the
result of multiple factors that will be reviewed in the following sections of this paper.
This equation was applied to a sample of seven commodities: bananas, beef, crude oil,
coffee, rice, sugar, and wheat. These commodities were selected with several factors in mind.
One aim was to choose commodities that have as little processing as possible in order to limit
the influence of exogenous factors. Another goal was to provide variation in terms of the
types of products.  For this reason, five of these commodities are produced in both industrial
and developing countries, while two are tropical products (coffee and bananas).  Only one
mineral commodity (crude oil) was selected because it is hard to match one specific final
product with such mineral commodities.  The eight following pairs of commodities/consumer
products were associated: bananas/bananas; beef/beef; crude oil/fuel oil; crude oil/gasoline;
coffee/coffee; sugar/sugar; wheat/bread; rice/rice.
The data on domestic consumer prices were compiled on an annual basis for the six
following countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italv, Japan, and the US.  The choice of an
annual frequency primarily reflects the need to economize on data collection efforts.  All  data
were handcopied from government publications of these respective countries.  This sample
was constrained by unequal access to comparable national sources for all countries at a fairly
desegregated level in the World Bank/International Monetary Fund Library in Washington,
D.C. (see Annex A). Nevertheless, these countries should capture a large portion of
worldwide consumption.  In addition, the differences in their trade and tax policies as well as
their production structures should guarantee enough diversity for the sample.  International
commodity prices were drawn from the World Bank data base (see Annex A).  Finally, the
exchange rate for every country was defined as the annual average rate reported in the IMF's
International Financial Statistics.
The results show an unambiguous positive long-term trend in the spreads. For
presentation purposes, the results are reported in index values rather than in percentage
variations in Figure 1 and Tables I a and l b.  The base year is 1990 for all variables
(1990=100).  Figure 1 shows that the (arithmetic) average spread for all commodities (and all
5countries)  has followed  a positive  trend over the past two decades,  with an acceleration  during
the 1980s. To account  for the annual  volatility  produced  by seasonal  and climatic  factors  in
commodity  markets,  the trend is best captured  by the 5-year moving  average  of the spread
index., which  doubled  froni a value of 51 to 117  between 1975  and 1994.  The decline  in the
early 1970s  is principally  explained  by the behavior  of oil prices since the average  index,
which excludes  this commodity,  actually  increased  during this period. Finally,  the recent
reduction  in the spread  observed  during  the period from 1993  to 1994 is principally  explained
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The increasing  trend in the spread  is robust  across countries  and commodities.  The
spreads surged  in all industrial  countries  between 1975  and 1994,  ranging  from an increase  of
80 percent in the United States to almost 150 percent in Japan (Table la).  Among the
European countries, the strongest increase was observed in Italy, followed by France and
Germany.  Similarly, the spreads rose in all commodity markets, by descending order from
the coffee to the banana markets (Table lb).  Most spreads declined in the first half of the
1970s due to unexpected commodity price booms, but they more than recovered during the
1980s. As a result, only the spread for crude oil/gasoline was still lower in 1994 than in the
beginning of the 1970s. Finally, the secular increase in the spreads is also demonstrated when
6Table la:
Spread  Index  by Country  (1990=100)  a/
Variation
1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1975-94
CANADA b/
Average  97  56  66  100  105  87%
Average  (excludingoi  63  54  68  97  102  90%
FRANCE  b/
Average  70  54  49  96  109  103%
Average  (excludingoi  42  49  49  86  105  114%
GERMANY c/
Average  93  62  59  95  117  90%
Average  (excludingoi  57  51  61  92  107  112%
ITALY b/
Average  65  53  53  90  118  124%
Average  (excludingoi  35  40  57  86  112  182%
JAPAN
Average  62  56  62  112  133  138%
Average  (excludingoi  44  50  62  108  126  153%
ULNITED STATES
Average  83  61  82  113  110  79%
Average  (excludingoi  56  60  90  122  112  87%
Notes:
a/ Annual  average  of all commodities  for each country
b/ Excluding  bananas
cl Excluding  bananas  and  rice
Table  lb:
Spread  Index  by Commodity  (1990=100)  a/
Variation
1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1975-94
Wheat/  Bread  37  39  47  82  106  173%
Coffee/Coffee  48  36  44  60  102  180%
Sugar/Sugar  55  55  98  171  136  147%
Rice/Rice b/  31  40  43  69  80  101%
Bananas/Bananas  c/  103  97  95  112  120  24%
Oil/Fuel  123  64  58  110  127  98%
Oil/Gasoline  175  82  51  104  128  57%
Beef/Beef  45  53  66  86  105  100%
Notes:
a/ Annual  average  of all countries  for each  commodity
bl Excluding  Germany
c/ Only for the  US and  Japanthe coverage period is extended to the 1960s, at least for countries where the data was readily
available (France, Italy, and the United States).
II.  The Asymmetric Response of Domestic Conisiumer  Prices to Changes in World
Prices
Why did the results presented above show a dramatic increase in the spread of most
commodity prices over the past two decades?  The answer lies in the asymmetric response of
domestic consumer prices to changes in world prices.  This section presents  a simple
empirical model of the relationship between the variations in world and domestic prices and
then examines the asymmetry in this relationship for the sample of commodities surveyed in
this paper.
The model used in this section is based on the approach developed by Mundlack and
Larson (1992), and briefly summarized here. This model assumes that world prices play a
significant role in setting domestic consumer prices but that exporters can discriminate prices
by using their monopolistic power.  As a result, the impact of world prices on domestic prices
is likely to vary across export destinations and commodities.  The model also predicts that
domestic prices will be influenced by the nominal exchange rate (ej,), labor costs (wjt),  and
the lagged domestic prices (pijt-]) Labor costs should capture processing costs in the
importing  country 4 (see explanation in the next section), while the lagged dependent variable
accounts for the presence of accumulated stocks and fixed-in-advance contracts between
buyers and sellers in most commodity markets (see Anderson and Tyers [1992]). Other
factors, such as changes in income in the destination market, may also play a role, although
most would be of secondary importance due to the magnitude and variability of world
commodity prices relative to changes in income.  Transportation costs, marketing costs, trade
barriers, and health and safety regulations that create subtle product differentiation were not
introduced into the model due to the lack of homogenous data.  The influence of these factors
will therefore be examined in the next section.
3This  approach  is similar  to the  one  followed  by the  authors  interested  in the  transmission  of exchange  rate
variations  to domestic  prices,  the  so-called  "pass-through"  literature.  See  Knetter  (1993),  for  a good  summary.
4Labor  costs  were  measured  as the  average  unit  labor  cost  in each industrial  country  covered  in our  sample.
The  data  were  extracted  from  the  International  Monetary  Fund  or UNIDO.
8The general model of domestic consumer price adjustment  I propose to estimate for
the seven commodities in the six main consumer markets covered in this paper can be written
as follows:
(2)  Apijt  =  PAp*it  + y Aejt  + pAwjt  + 4Apijt_t
All variables are defined in the text.  The coefficient D is the elasticity of the change in
the domestic price with respect to the change in the world price, to be referred to as the
elasticity of transmission. The statistical interpretation of  the P's is straightforvard.  A value
of 1 implies that the variations in world prices are fully transmitted to domestic prices.
However, a perfect correlation should not be expected since the commodity price is unlikely
to account for 100 % of the consumer price.  What I trv to show first is that there exists a
significant and positive relationship between these two prices and then, that this relationship is
asymmetric.  The above equation was estimated for six countries and seven commodities from
1975 to 1994 using the random-effect estimation technique (see detailed results in Annex B).
Bananas and rice were dropped because the data on their consumer prices were not available
for all industrial countries surveyed in this paper.
Overall, the estimated elasticities of transmission indicate a positive and significant
relationship between world and domestic prices in commodity markets (Table 2). The values
of the elasticities are relatively low but such results can be expected with regressions in
variations rather than levels. 5 A large portion of the price transmission seems to be made
within one year, in contradiction with the results found by Anderson and Tyers for the 1  960s
and 1  970s.  The difference may be due to the more recent coverage period used in this paper,
for it reflects the emergence of the large commodity funds in the 1  980s, which have increased
arbitrage opportunities and possibly shortened the transmission time between world and
domestic prices. 6
So far, the model assumes that upward and downward movements in world
commodity prices have been equally transmitted to domestic prices.  But, in reality, the
elasticity of transmission may differ in periods of increasing or decreasing world prices. For
5  1 use variables  in first  differences  to reduce  the possibility  of spurious  correlations  associated  with  time-
series data when  measured  in levels.
6  For a study of the long-term  relationship  between  world and domestic  prices, a co-integrated  approach  could
be developed  along the lines  followed  bv Palaskas  (1995). However,  the limited  number  of annual  observations
for each commodity  prevented a similar  approach  in this paper.
9example, the surge in oil price was almost perfectly passed on to domestic fuel prices in the
early 1970s, but the decline of 30 percent  observed in the early 1  990s was not transmitted to
domestic gasoline prices, which actually rose on average by 5 percent in the six countries
surveyed in this paper. More generally, the asymmetric response of domestic prices was
tested by estimating equation (2) for the years of increasing and for those of decreasing world
prices.  The results for these two respective sub-periods are presented in the "Upward
Movements"  and "Downward Movements" columns of Table 2.
Table 2:
Short-term and Long-term Elasticities of Transmission
Total Period  Upward  Downward
Short-Run  Long-Run  Movements a/  Movements a/
Coffee  .25  .34  .31  .15
Sugar  .03  .06  .15  -.04
Wheat  .03*  .05  .23  -.13
Beef  .10  .11  .26  .12*
Gasoline  .15  .15  .24  .17
Fuel  .13  .14  .32  .16
Note: (*) not significantly different from 0 at a 5 percent level.
a/  Only short-term elasticities are recorded because the long-
term elasticities cannot be estimated for upward and downward
movements due to the discontinuity of the years analyzed.
The empirical results seem to support the hypothesis of asymmetric transmission of
movements in world prices in all commodity markets.  The elasticity of transmission has
alwavs been much higher, on average 3.4 times higher, when the world prices were increasing
rather than decreasing. Any decline in the international prices of sugar and beef is unlikely to
be passed on to consumer prices, while reductions in petroleum and coffee prices are
transmitted but much less than the corresponding increases.  If upward movements are
perfectly transmitted but downward movements are not the spread between world and
10domestic prices will increase continuously over time, as reported in the first section of this
paper.  By comparison, Knetter [1993] found the inverse result for a sample of manufacturing
products.  Prices adjusted more rapidly to exchange rate depreciation (equivalent to a decline
in world prices), suggesting that exporters of manufactured goods choose to increase their
market shares rather than their markups.  Similar behavior could not be shown in commodity
markets.
Finally,  the transmission from world to domestic prices has been remarkably similar
in all consuming countries surveyed in this paper.  The elasticities of transmission do not
significantly differ across countries, as shown by the weak performance of the fixed-effect
technique.'  This finding was confirmed by the fact that the spreads of each commodity
moved jointly in all industrial countries. The cross-country contemporaneous correlation
between the spreads ranges from a minimum of 0.53 in the fuel market to a maximum 0.95 in
the gasoline market (Annex C). 8 Since international effects appear to be more important than
host-country effects in explaining the asymmetric response of domestic prices, the next
section focuses exclusively on these effects.
III.  How to Explain  the Asymmetric Response  of Domestic Prices
Explaining the growing spreads and the asymmetric price transmission is clearly a
matter of investigating the determinants of the price of each of the consumer goods in my
sample.  One approach is to carefully examine each product in every country. The quantity of
data required is clearly beyond the scope of this paper.  A second possibility and the one I
have selected follow a global approach that is, in my view, justified by the homogeneity of the
increasing spreads across countries and commodities.
There are multiple possible explanations for the asymmetric response of domestic
prices to changes in world commodity prices, which obviously, cannot occur in a frictionless
competitive model of trade. The two most popular explanations are the presence of trade
restrictions in the main consumer markets, and increasing processing costs that act as
bottlenecks in the trade of commodities. Still, these two explanations seem to be a drastic
simplification of the reality.  While no consensus will emerge yet, this section suggests that
7  Results are available upon request.
s Notice that, on the contrary, the variations in the spread of different commodities are only weakly correlated
within each country (see Annex C for a presentation of the contemporaneous correlation).
11the market power of intermediaries, international trading companies, is another possible
explanation for the asymmetry.  Surprisingly, their role  has been largely ignored in the
economic literature. 9
The first explanation is based on the existence of trade restrictions in most industrial
countries, and has been used by many authors interested in explaining the asymmetric
transmission of exchange rates (see Knetter [1993]). It suggests that in the presence of binding
quantity constraints in export markets, the decline in world commodity prices will not be
transmitted to domestic prices because there is no incentive for exporters to stimulate the final
demand by reducing their selling prices. Exporters will instead increase their margins.
Empirical support to this theory is provided by the numerous import barriers faced by
commodity exporters in consumer markets (see Anderson and Tyers [1994] for examples).
The asymmetric transmission of world commodity prices has also been enhanced by using
instruments specifically designed to insulate domestic producers from lower world prices.
Perhaps the most notorious examples are the levies and variable tariffs adopted as part of the
European agricultural policy, but examples can be found in other industrial countries as well
(see Mitchell and Duncan [1987]).
The second explanation for the asymmetric response of domestic prices is that
exporters face a series of binding internal constraints when they want to increase their sales
abroad.  For example, Foster and Baldwin [1986] introduce an approach using a fixed
proportion marketing technology that is required to sell products in the foreign markets. This
approach predicts that declines in world prices will be only imperfectly transmitted to
domestic prices because, if existing sales are constrained by marketing capacity, exporters
will compensate for increasing marketing costs by raising their selling prices.  This increase
will partially offset the initial impact of declining world prices on domestic prices.  Since
there is no similar constraint on higher world prices, one might expect more domestic price
adjustments to occur with rising than with declining world prices. Potentially, this bottleneck
approach can apply to a variety of costs, such as processing, distribution. marketing, and
transportation, all of which play a significant role in setting domestic prices in commodity
markets.
9  The  market  power  exerted  by exporting  countries  is  not considered  in this  paper.  These  countries  can
influence  world  prices  but certainly  not  their  transmission  to domestic  consumer  prices.  The  role  of national
marketing  boards  and  producers'  cartels  is a different  issue  that  clearly  goes  beyond  the  scope  of this  paper.
12Table  3:
Spreads  and Effective  Rates  of Protection  (ERPs)
(Percentage change between 1986-88 and 1989-93)
Europe  '  Japan  United States
Sugar  ERP  -38%  -16%  -49%
Spread  -13%  -16%  -34%
Wheat  ERP  -36%  -24%  0%
Spread  9%  1%  7%
Coffee  ERP  na  na  0%
Spread  23%  33%  45%
Beef  ERP  17%  -54%  -33%
Spread  7%  6%  6%
Rice  ERP  -33%  -20%  100%
Spread  6%  -1%  4%
Sources: Ingco (1995) for the effective rates of protection
and my calculations for the spreads.
Notes:
a! Only Germany, France, and Italy
The contribution of trade restrictions and bottleneck costs to the asymmetric response
of domestic prices might not be as important as appears at first sight.  Indeed, the variations in
trade restrictions are weakly correlated to the movements in the spreads for the commodities
and countries surveyed in this paper. The weakness of this correlation is most apparent when,
despite significant differences in trade protection between Europe, Japan, and North America,
the spreads have moved almost simultaneously in all these regions (see Annex C).  The flaws
of the hypothesized link are further exposed by the weak correlation between the effective
rates of protection and the spreads.'" As reported in Table 3, only in the case of sugar did
'° Effective  rates  of protection  present  the  advantage  of capturing  both  the  effects  of  both  tariffs  and  non-tariff
barriers. Obtaining  exact measurements  of the effective  rate of protection  is always  difficult,  even  for relatively
homogenous  products  such as foodstuffs.  The differing  qualities  of products  to which  available  price data  refer
and the presence  of data on marketing  margins  are but two of the problems  associated  with using  even  the
simplest  indicator  of the extent  of distortions.
13these two variables move in the same direction in all consumer markets between 1986 and
1994.  Finally, it is certainly audacious to think that movements in trade barriers have
significantly contributed to the surge in the spreads of coffee and rice in the United States, up
85 percent and 1  12 percent; respectively, over the period from 1975 to 1994, when their
effective rates of protection were on average below 2 percent during this period.
Even the bottleneck approach does not work well for the simple reason that the costs
associated with commodity exports have been declining over the past few decades. Indeed,
transportation and insurance costs, which may contribute up to 10-20 percent of the final
value of commodities," have followed a descending trend over the past 20 years.  For
example, Amadji and Yeats [1995] report that the share of these costs in the total exports of
developing countries declined from 7.8 percent in 1970 to 5.8 percent in 1991. The
international evidence on marketing and distribution costs is more limited, but the trend in the
United States has also been clearly negative,-down from 18 percent of GDP in 1980 to only
10 percent of GDP in 1994.12  Technological progress and new management techniques have
clearlv contributed to this trend. Among many examples, electronic data interchanges have
powered up market clearing activities, and  just-in-time techniques as well as new hedging
instruments (e.g., warehouse bonds) have reduced consignment and inventory costs.
The bottleneck approach may, however, partially explain the asymmetric transmission
of world commodity prices through rising processing costs, even though their influence was
limited by the kind of commodities selected in this paper.  Unlike transportation and
marketing costs, processing costs have certainly increased over time due to higher wages in
processing facilities (most are located in industrial countries).  The direct evidence at hand
remains sketchy but there is no reason to believe that these wages have behaved differently
from average industrial wages.  And, over the past two decades, average nominal industrial
wages have seen a fivefold increase in the six countries analyzed in this paper. Higher
processing costs can also be explained by the improved quality of consumer products such as
unleaded gasoline and high-quality coffee (robusta vs. arabica).  Nevertheless, processing
costs need to play a very important role in sales to explain the asymmetric response of
consumer prices. As an illustration, I estimated that the impact of the average labor costs  --as
a proxy for processing costs-- on domestic consumer prices should exceed by four times that
]  IAtkin  (1992) reports that transportation costs may account for 10 percent of the landed price of grain on a
trade route between efficient ports used by large vessels (e.g., from New Orleans to Rotterdam) and 20 percent
on a less efficient route.
12  Source: Logistic Management Council (1996).
14of world prices to compensate entirely for the increasing gap between world and consumer
prices in the commodity markets examined in this paper. "
If the other explanaiions cannot provide a satisfactory answer to the rising spreads,
another reason has to be found.  The third explanation for asymmetry is derived from the
presence of large trading companies in international commodity markets. The focus is on the
large trading companies because their strategic position between buyers and sellers allows
them to influence the transmission of world prices.  Such an effect may occur when they
purchase commodities from producers and/or when they sell these products to other
intermediaries, processors, and consumers.  These companies generally provide information,
define the terms of transactions, manage the payments and record keeping for transactions,
and so figure out ways of clearing the market (see Spulber [1996]). However, without
competition, they may follow a pricing strategy that will maximize their profits and not those
of producers and consumers.  Such behavior could create an asymmetric response of the same
sort as the bottleneck and trade restriction models described earlier.' 4
The issue of the market power of intemational trading companies remains largely
ignored in the current literature.  Several recent empirical studies have shown the existence of
market power in most commodity markets,' 5 but none of the leading joumals of international
trade and economic development"  contain any reference to the influence of these companies.
This lack of interest possibly arises from the difficulty of capturing the behavior of these
companies in an integrated analytical framework. In addition to their trading activities. many
companies are vertically integrated and thus close to production.  For example, Cargill--the
world's  largest trading company of cereals--owns plantations, storage facilities, and vessels in
many countries around the world.  Similarly, Exxon carries out not only mining and refining
13  In other terms,  equation  (1) was modified  as follows:  Aliij = Apij  - atA(ejp*i)  - (l-c)Awj where  wj  is
defined  as the unit labor  cost in the recipient  country  j and a as the weight  of the world  commodity  price in the
production  function. The value  of the parameter  a is difficult  to estimate  in the absence  of precise  information
but must be as low  as 0.2 for eliminating  the spread  between  world and domestic  prices in most commodity
markets  over the period  from 1975  to 1994. These  results  are available  upon request.
14  While  it is not done in this paper,  a model  of imperfect  competition  --or price leadership--  behavior  could
show that  declines  in world  prices  will not be transmitted  to consumer  prices, and the output  level will  not
increase,  at least  not as much that  in a competitive  market. In contrast,  an increase  in world  prices  would  be
automatically  transmitted  to domestic  prices  because  intermediaries  maintain  their margins.
15  Recent  studies  include  Buschena  and Perloff  (1991)  on the coconut  oil export  market;  Karp  and Perloff
(1989, 1993)  on the rice and coffee  exports;  Lopez  and Yon  (1993) on the Haitian  coffee  exporting;  and
Deodhar  and Skeldon  (1995)  on the banana  export  markets.
16  Sources  examined  (for the past five  years)  were the Journal of Development  Economics  and  the Journal  of
International  Economics  as well as the NBER  working  paper series.  Notice,  however,  that  this issue  has been
raised by non-mainstream  economists  such as Brown  (1992).
15but also a complex  set  of activities  involving  distribution,  transportation,  inventories,  and
pricing. The distinction  between  wholesale  and retail trading is also not clear-cut. If most of
these companies  are involved  in wholesales--transactions  between business--there  are many
examples in which  they  also act in the retail sector either directly  or indirectly  through
strategic alliances  or intermediary  arrangements. 7 Additional  studies  are necessary  to identify
at the stage of the intermediary  process  at which  the highest profit is likely  to be made:
wholesale or retail. The response  is likely  to vary across countries  and commodities.
Table 4:
The World's  Largest  Wholesale  Trade Companies:
1988
Firm  Home  Sales
Country  (US$ Million)
C. Itoh. Ltd.  Japan  106,791
Mitsui & Co. Ltd.  Japan  102,493
Marubeni  Corp.  Japan  95,823
Sumitomo  Corp.  Japan  94,479
Mitsubishi  Corp.  Japan  91,583
Nissho  Iwai Corp.  Japan  52,942
Cargill  US  43,000
Tokyo Menka  Kaisha  Japan  31,945
Sharps  Pixley Ltd.  UK  30,077
Nichimen  Corp.  Japan  26,874
Source:  Directory  of the World's Largest Service
Companies,  Moody's Investors  Service,  and United
Nations  Centre  on Transnational  Corporations,
December  1990.
Preliminary  evidence  indicates  that large trading  companies  have  been capable  of
influencing  the transmission  of world  commodity  prices to domestic  prices. This is suggested
first by the concentration  of trading  activities  in few companies  worldwide. UNCTAD  has
17For  example,  Itoh,  the world's  largest wholesaler, owns coffee shops and pubs, and most oil companies
possess gas stations. Citgo,  Texaco,  Shell,  Amocco,  Exxon,  and Chevron  are the largest  gasoline  brands  by
number of stations,  and are major  wholesalers  and distributors  as well.
16reported that six or fewer trading companies control about 70 percent of the total international
trade. thus obviously limiting the choice of producers and consumers in these markets.8 As
an example, the banana export market is dominated by Del Monte, United Brands, and
Standard Fruits, and the wlieat export market by Cargill, Continental, Andre, Dreyfuss, and
Bunge-Born.  The suspicion that these companies use their dominant position to control prices
is strengthened by the chronic absence of information on their activities.  While many people
can name retailers, few know wholesalers.  These companies are often larger than the
economies of many developing countries (Table 4).  For instance, the sale volume of the
world's  largest trading company, C. Itoh, was as big as Argentina's GDP in 1988. The same
company also traded over US$20 billion of agricultural products--as much as all the sugar,
coffee, beef, rice, and wheat exported by all developing countries at that time.
The trading companies' position of influence on the world market is further implied by
the correlation between the variations in the spreads and the variations in the profits of the
trading companies.  Unfortunately, this hypothesis was tested only for the oil market because
of the chronic lack of data on these intermediary companies.  For each 10 percent variation in
the spread between world and domestic oil prices, the profit of the 7 largest oil companies in
the United States has changed on average by 8 percent during the period from 1979 to 1994.'9
Another indicator of correlation is that the markup in the wheat market grew by 50 percent
over the past two decades, while the sales of Cargill, the world's largest trader of wheat, saw a
fivefold increase during this period.  In a historical perspective, it is suggestive that this firm
has recorded an annual loss in only 3 of its 130 years of existence: 1921, 1936, and 1938.20
Finally, as discussed in the preceding section, the spreads of each commodity tend to
move jointly in all industrial consumer markets.  This homogenous behavior may reflect the
influence of trading companies that are specialized in trading one commodity around the
world rather than several commodities in one country.  Companies such as Cargill and
Continental trade almost exclusively in cereals in over 60 countries.  A similar approach is
taken by the petroleum trading companies and therefore gasoline prices have a tendency to
increase and decrease at the same time around the world.
is  Source:  UNCTAD,  reported  by Brown  (1992).
19 Calculated  on  the  basis  of information  extracted  from  Fortune  (various  issues).  To  make  the  measurement
of profits and markups  compatible,  the profit is defined  as the ratio  of total  net profits  of large US  oil companies
to the international  petroleum price  (1990=100). The markup  index is measured  by equation  (1). The  major  oil
companies  include  Exxon,  Mobil,  Texaco,  Chevron,  Amoco,  Atlantic Richfield,  Philips  Oil, and Ashland  Oil.
20  Source:  The Economist,  March  1996.
17IV.  Wlat Are the Consequencesfor Commodity  Exporting Countries?
Rising spreads haveu  had important consequences for commodity exporting countries,
especially for those depending heavily on a few commodities.  Over the past two decades,
these countries have lost through the decline in world commodity prices and through the
limited response of domestic demand for these products on main consumer markets. This
section attempts to estimate how much additional export revenue these countries would have
earned if the spreads had remained constant in the past few years, using a simple model of
international trade.  Finally, the results of two simulation exercises are presented for the
sample of commodities surveyed in this paper.
The consequences of rising spreads on export revenues are illustrated as simply as
possible with a standard, partial model of international trade in which the commodity supply
function is determined by world prices and the demand by domestic prices in consuming
countries. 2'  For the sake of simplicity, these two functions are not influenced by changes in
relative prices and income, which are subsumed in the constant term of these functions. There
are neither dynamic effects nor strategic interactions between trading companies as the
variations in the spreads are assumed to be exogenously determined.  The model is
principally intended to show the potential impact of rising spreads rather than analyze actual
21  Thus, the demand  and supply  functions  can be written as follows:
Qs;  = A ep*j 1 s
Qdjj  =  C  pjEd
where  £s and Ed  are defined  as the elasticity  of supply  and demand,  A and  C as constant  parameters,
Qd,i  the demand for commodity  i by consumers  in country  j, and Qsi the supply  of commoditv  i by all
developing  countries. Other  variables  have  been defined  earlier.
Taking the log differential  of the above equations  and of the markup  defined  as pt = pi/p*, the effects  of
a change in markup  on export  revenues  (dRi)  and producer  surplus  (dSi)  are equal  to:
dRi =-  ((I+Es)sd)/(sd-es)]  d,i 1
dS,  = (C/(Es+  1)) [(1-  Ed/(Ed+es)dlv)ep*i)Es  - p*j `I
The positive  effects  of a decrease  in markups  are embodied in these  two  differential  equations. A lower
markup  reduces  the selling  price  on industrial  markets. That, in turn,  generates  an increase  in the final  demand.
The resulting  effect  would  therefore  be positive  on both  the export revenues  and the producer's  surplus.  The
magnitude  of these potential  positive  effects  depends  partially  on the percentage  variation  in the markup  and
partially  on the (absolute)  value  of the elasticities  of demand  and supply.
18pricing decisions.  Nevertheless, it is easy to show that lower spreads reduce domestic
consumer prices, which increases the final demand for commodities and, thus, export
revenues.  Obviously, the magnitude of these effects will depend on the reduction in the
spreads and the values of sipply  and demand price elasticities.
The above model was applied to the sample of commodities over the period from 1991
to 1994. Rather than estimating the elasticity values of the demand  and supply functions, I
used those estimated by the United Nations [1990], which are in the lower range reported by
Goldstein and Khan [1989]. These values are fixed over time, even though they should vary
as changes in prices imply changes in the degree of policy intervention and in the degree of
substitutability between products.  However, within feasible ranges, these variations should
not modify the basic reliability of the results presented below.  The exogenous variations in
the spreads are assumed to equal the percentage difference, first of all,  between the actual
spread and the minimum spread observed during the period from 1970 to 1994 (case A) and,
second, between the actual spread and the average spread observed during the period from
1970 to 1994 (case B).  All the parameters used for these simulations are summarized in
Annex D.
Table 5 shows that developing countries would have doubled their export revenues
from 1991 to 1994 if the spreads had remained at their minimal levels of the past two decades.
If the spreads had been maintained at their average levels, additional export revenues would
have reached US$40 billion per year, or about 27 percent of the actual revenues from the six
commodities selected in this paper. The potential gains for producers would have also ranged
from US$29 billion in case B to US$96 billion in case A.  These results only apply to
developing countries.  Indeed, industrial countries may have benefited from asymmetry
through higher tax revenues, higher value-added in their processing facilities, and higher
intermediary margins in their trading companies, even though their consumers are clearly
among the major losers.  An estimate of the net potential gains/losses for the industrial
countries would need to take into account these redistribution effects.
19Table 5:
Main Results of the Simulation Exercises
(US$ Billion)
Export  Producer
Revenue Gains  Surplus Gains
Case A  Case B  Case A  Case B
Oil (fuel)  102.1  33.0  77.1  22.9
Rice  1.9  1.0  1.5  0.7
Sugar  8.7  1.9  7.4  1.4
Coffee  9.1  3.9  8.3  3.2
Beef  0.9  0.4  0.6  0.3
Wheat  1.3  0.5  1.1  0.4
TOTAL  124.0  40.6  96.0  29.0
Memo:
Oil (gasoline)  59.7  19.7  39.8  13.1
Notes:
Case A: Percentage difference between the 1991-94
spread and the minimum spread observed during the
period 1970-94.
Case B: Percentage difference between the 1991-94 spread
and the average markup observed during the 1970-94
period.
The simulation results indicate that petroleum would have accounted for about 80
percent of these additional potential gains since this commodity represents a large proportion
of  the total exports from developincg  countries.  Other commnodities  would have also
witnessed a significant increase in their export earnings.  For example, the revenues derived
from coffee, sugar, beef, and wheat exports would have more than doubled in case A, and
increased in the range of 20-60 percent annually in case B.  These results are consistent with
the large percentage differences in the spreads observed for these commodities.
20As expected the developing countries that have suffered the most are those that are
heavily  dependent on oil exports such as Saudi Arabia. the CIS countries, and Nigeria (Table
6).  Brazil is also a major loser due to its significant dependence on coffee and sugar exports.
For smaller countries, the cbnsequences are even more dramatic because they rely on only one
or two commodities for their exports.  For example, Mauritius may have increased its total
export revenues by an estimated 30 percent if the spread in the sugar market had remained at
its minimal level.  Similar results are obtained in the coffee market for El Salvador, Kenya,
Madagascar, and Colombia (respectively,  50, 28, 27, and 25 percent of  their total export
revenues).  The above results are only indicative.  As already mentioned, the model is
extremely simple.
V.  Concluding Remarks
The relatively low income and price elasticities of demand for commodities was
emphasized by Prebisch and Singer about 35 years ago.  This paper goes one step further by
suggesting that the final demand for these products could not have increased in the major
consumer markets because the declines in world commodity prices were not transmitted or
were transmitted imperfectly to domestic consumer prices.  In contrast, upward movements in
world prices were clearly passed on to domestic prices.  As a result of this asymmetry, the
spread between world commodity prices and domestic consumer prices has increased over
time, about 100 percent on average for the seven commodities analyzed in this paper over the
past 25 years.  This asymmetry has had severe implications for the commodity exporting
countries, who may have lost as much as US$ 100 billion per year in export revenues.
In this paper, I have to attempted to review a number of possible explanations for the
asymmetry, which is the most logical way to proceed without an existing general analytical
framework in the economic literature.  A consistent finding across commodity markets has
been the simultaneous movement of the spreads in all countries, thus suggesting the influence
of international rather than country-specific factors. There are at least two international
factors that may explain the asymmetric response of domestic prices in commodity markets.
First, the high quantitative restrictions on international commodity trade have discouraged
exporters from stimulating the final demand by transmitting the decrease in world prices to
domestic consumer prices.  Second, the processing costs have been increasing due to rising
labor costs and improvements in the quality of the final products associated with most
commodities.  In contrast, other costs such as transportation, insurance, distribution, and
21Table 6:
Major Losers  Ranked  by Export  Losses
Export  Value  Export Revenue  Losses  Export Revenue  Losses
per  Commodity a/  Case A  Case B  Case A  Case B
(US$ Million)  (US$ Million)  (Share of Country's  Total
Exports)
Petroleum  Oil
Saudi  Arabia  22,500  12,996  4,195  49.2%  15.9%
CIS  11,400  6,585  2,125  22.9%  7.4%
Iraq  10,500  6,065  1,958  56.7%  18.3%
Nigeria  8,420  4,863  1,570  52.9%  17.1%
UER  7,960  4,598  1,484  48.0%  15.5%
Venezuela  7,490  4,326  1,396  44.1%  14.2%
Mexico  6,820  3,939  1,272  12.2%  3.9%
Coffee
Brazil  1,946  2,229  942  7.7%  3.3%
Columbia  1,656  1,897  801  37.3%  15.8%
Indonesia  553  633  267  3.4%  1.4%
Mexico  368  422  178  1.3%  0.5%
Guatamala  293  336  142  25.9%  11.0%
Costa  Rica  256  293  124  17.7%  7.5%
India  255  292  123  2.5%  1.0%
Sugar
Brazil  894  835  182  2.9%  0.6%
Thailand  620  579  126  3.7%  0.8%
China  538  503  110  0.6%  0.1%
Mauritius  350  327  71  35.7%  7.8%
Colombia  163  152  33  3.0%  0.7%
Turkey  163  152  33  2.0%  0.4%
Guatamala  162  151  33  11.7%  2.6%
Rice
Thailand  1,429  489  252  0.6%  0.3%
India  397  136  70  1.1%  0.6%
China  384  131  68  3.4%  1.7%
Pakistan  293  100  52  0.5%  0.3%
Uruguay  151  52  27  2.4%  1.2%
Argentina  78  27  14  0.3%  0.2%
Egypt  60  20  10  0.7%  0.4%
Wheat
Turkey  95  62  25  0.8%  0.3%
Argentina  48  32  13  0.4%  0.2%
China  33  22  9  0.0%  0.0%
South Africa  30  20  8  0.1%  0.0%
Singapor  23  15  6  0.1%  0.0%
Malaysia  17  11  5  0.0%  0.0%
Greece  14  10  4  0.1%  0.0%
Notes:
a/ Average  1993-94. Source: Finger  and Reincke (1995) and UN trade  data  system.marketing do not appear to play a role in the rising spreads.  These costs have followed a
declining trend over the past few decades and would thus explain a decline rather than an
increase in the spreads.
There is little consensus on this issue, but the above explanations do not seem to
provide a complete answer.  Indeed, it appears that trade restrictions are only weakly
correlated with the movements in the spreads, an observation that is consistent across
countries and in one country over time.  The contribution of processing costs to the
increasing spreads is certainly limited in most cases examined here because the sample of
commodities covered in this paper involves little processing between the commodity and the
final product sold on consumer markets. For these reasons, another explanation had to be
found to explain the asynmmetric  transmission of world prices.
This paper has argued that international trading companies are likely to influence the
relationship between world and domestic prices.  Their dominant position in most commodity
markets enables them to affect the spreads between the buyer and the seller prices
simultaneously in many countries.  Some preliminary evidence points in that direction, but
surprisingly policy-makers. economists, and consumers seem to remain largely unaware of
these companies, even though they are often bigger than developing economies.  The current
academic literature as well as international institutions have traditionally ignored their
presence.  This insufficient attention partially explains why the debate over these companies
lacks focus and clarity and why there are various misconceptions about what these companies
actually do and whether their activities are a legitimate cause for public concern.
This paper should be viewed as a starting point for discussion. Possible directions for
future research include an attempt to better understand the determinants of the consumer
prices and of the role of intermediaries at both the wvholesale  and retail levels.  In that sense,
the first recommendation would be therefore to collect information on the activities of these
companies.  Competitive (or contestable) markets assume homogenous information. Today,
producers  and consumers generally have few alternatives when they trade their products in
foreign markets because of the lack of information.  Collecting information will require a
concerted effort from the international communitv.  First, it is crucial that the large
international trading companies cooperate and disclose information on their activities and
transactions.  Second, this effort must necessarily involve the World Bank and the World
Trade Organization because they have both the necessary financial and human resources to
undertake such an operation on a worldwide basis.
23The second recommendation is that economists incorporate the subject of
intermediation within the basic framework of international trade.  So far, trading companies
might have been overlooked because they are located at the crossroads of different aspects of
economic theory: business, industrial organization, international trade and finance, as well as
public finance.  The new international trade theory has emphasized the increasing rate of
returns and imperfect competition but not at the intermediary level.  There is a need to
understand the behavior of the trading companies as well as the determinants of their pricing
strategies to evaluate whether they operate efficiently.  The remaining issue is to determnine
whether these companies seek to maximize their profits at the expense of those of consumers
and producers.
Free trade requires fair trade.  For the first time, anything can be sold everywhere and
thus understanding the role of the international trading companies in commodities markets
will become even more important in the future.
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26ANNEX A:
Data  Sources  and  definitions
A.  Description  of Domestic  Price  Series  a/
Commodity/  Canada  France  Germany  Italy  Japan  USA
End-User  Product
Bananas/Bananas  /  /
Beef/Beef  I  /  V  /  f  /
Oil] Fuel  V  I  bl  /  /  /  /
Oil/Gasoline  I  I  I  /  /  I
Coffee/Coffee  /  I  It  I  I  I  c/
Rice/Rice  /  /  /  /  d/
Wheat/Bread  /  1  1  1  V  1
Sugar/Sugar  /  /  V  /  I  I  e/
Sources:  National  statistics  for consumer price indexes  and World Bank for commodity price
index.
Notes:
a/  The annual  domestic consumer price series were available  for the following periods:
Canada  (1970 and  1975-94), France  (1964-94), Germany  (1966-94), Italy  (1960-94),  Japan
(1973-94), and the US (1960-94).
b/ Only available  for the period 1971-94.
c/ Only available  for the period 1969-94.
d/ Only available for the period 197  8-94.
e/ Only available  for the period 1970-94.
B.  Description  of International  Commodity  Prices
Coffee:  All Coffee, New York, US cents/LB
Sugar:  Caribbean,  New York, US cents/LB
Beef:, All origins, US Ports, US cents/LB
Wheat:  US, US Gulf Ports, US$/Bushel
Crude  Oil (petroleum): Average Crude Price, US$/Barrel:
Bananas:  Latin America, US Ports; US cents/LB
Rice: US, New Orleans,  US$/MfT
Source: The World Bank. International  Economic Department
27ANNEX  B:
Regression  Results
Elasticity  of Transmission  from  World  Prices to  Domestic  Consumer  Prices
Panel  of six countries  (1975-94)
Coffee  Beef  Sugar
(1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)
WorldPrice  0.25  0.31  0.15  0.10  0.26  0.12  0.03  0.15  -0.04
(6.85)  (5.51)  (2.06)  (2.30)  (4.13)  (.71)  (2.26)  (4.81)  (-0.54)
Exchange  Rate  -0.02  0.02  -0.02  0.14  0.24  0.09  0.19  0.15  0.22
(-.12)  (.10)  (-0.11)  (2.38)  (2.47)  (1.23)  (3.19)  (2.04)  (2.40)
Industrial  Wage  0.44  1.13  0.01  0.21  0.17  0.77  0.49  0.24  0.40
(2.05)  (2.88)  (.439)  (2.01)  (1.33)  (5.54)  (7.62)  (2.56)  (2.75)
Lagged Domestic  Price  0.26  0.09  0.50
(2.01)  (1.97)  (2.34)
AdjR2  0.32  0.43  0.05  0.13  0.25  0.24  0.15  0.33  0.17
DWV  1.93  2.24  2.33  1.63  1.86  1.92  1.48  1.72  1.73
Observations  114  60  54  114  54  60  114  60  54
Wheat  Oil/Gasoline  Oil/Fuel
(1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)
World Price  0.03  0.23  -0.13  0.15  0.24  0.17  0.13  0.32  0.16
(1.04)  (3.08)  (-2.10)  (4.50)  (4.32)  (3.13)  (2.98)  (4.33  (1.64)
Exchange  Rate  0.15  0.24  0.17  0.27  0.09  0.29  0.33  0.05  0.30
(3.30)  (2.29)  (3.41)  (3.18)  (.82)  (1.56)  (2.59)  (3.18)  (1.00)
Industrial  Wage  0.32  0.41  0.58  0.49  1.04  0.30  0.62  1.42  0.46
(4.05)  (3.82)  (5.84)  (5.00)  (5.45)  (1.87)  (4.23)  (5.48)  (1.78)
Lagged Domestic Price  0.40  0.01  0.07
(1.77)  (2.13)  (2.41)
Ad!R-2  0.23  0.12  0.39  0.29  0.50  0.01  0.22  0.48  0.01
DW  1.62  L.41  1.71  2.18  1.80  2.13  2.17  1.81  2.28
Observations  114  48  66  114  66  48  114  66  48
Notes:
All variables are expresed in log and in variations.
Column  (1) are the estimated results for the entire period.
Column  (2) are the estimated results for the years with upward movements in world prices.
Column  (3) are the estimated results for the years with downward movements in world prices.
28AnnexC:
Contemporaneous  Correlations
Cross-Country  Correlation  by Commodity
1970-94
COFFEE
Japan  France  Germany  Canada  Italv  US
Japan  1  0
France  0.7  1  0
Germany  0.5  0.8  1.0
Canada  0.9  0.5  0.6  1.0
Italy  0.9  0.6  0.5  0.8  1 0
Us  09  0.2  0.0  0.8  08  1 0
FUEL
Japan  France  Germany  Canada  ltaly  US
Japan  1.0
France  0.7  1.0
Gernany  0.7  0.7  1.0
Canada  0.7  07  0.5  1.0
Italy  05  0.0  0.3  0.3  1.0
US  0.7  0.8  0.6  0.7  0.0  1.0
GASOLINE
Japan  France  Germnany Canada  Italy  US
Japan  1.0
France  1.0  1.0
Germany  0.9  0.9  1.0
Canada  0.9  1.0  0.9  10
Italy  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0
US  0.9  1.0  0.9  0.9  1.0  1.0
RICE
Japan  France  Germany  Canada  Italy  US
Japan  1.0
France  0.9  1.0
Germnany  NA  NA  NA
Canada  0.8  0.8  NA  1.0
Italy  0.9  0.7  NA  0.8  1.0
US  0.8  0.7  NA  0.9  0.9  1.0
WHEAT
Japan  France  Germany  Canada  Italy  US
Japan  l10
France  1.0  1.0
Germany  1.0  1.0  1.0
Canada  09  0.9  0.9  1.0
Italy  1.0  1.0  0.9  0.9  1.0
US  1.0  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  1.0
SUGAR
Japan  France  Germany  Canada  Italy  US
Japan  1.0
France  0.9  1.0
Gernany  0.9  0.9  1.0
Canada  0.9  0.9  0.9  1.0
Italy  1.0  1.0  0.9  1.0  1.0
US  0.9  0.9  0.9  1.0  0.9  1.0
BEEF
Japan  France  Germany  Canada  Italy  US
Japan  1.0
France  0.9  1.0
Germany  0.5  0.6  1.0
Canada  0.8  0.8  0.3  1.0
Italy  0.8  0.8  0.3  0.7  1.0
US  0.4  0.6  0.4  0.5  0.5  1.0
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1970-94
US
Coffee  Banana  Sugar  Rice  Bread  Gasoline  Fuel  Beef
Coffee  1.0
Banana  0.2  1.0
Sugar  0.5  0.1  1.0
Rice  0.8  0.3  0.6  1.0
Bread  0.5  0.3  0.4  0.6  1.0
Gasoline  -0.7  -0.1  -0.5  -0.7  0.1  1.0
Fuel  -0.3  0.0  -0.3  -0.3  0.5  0.9  1.0
Beef  -0.3  -0.2  -0.2  -0.1  0.1  0.3  0.3  1.0
JAPAN
Beef  Banana  Coffee  Fuel  Gasoline  Sugar  Bread  Rice
Beef  1.0
Banana  0.5  1.0
coffee  0.7  0.5  1.0
Fuel  0.7  0.6  0.5  1.0
Gasoline  0.5  0.6  0.4  0.7  1.0
Sugar  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.2  1.0
Bread  0.9  0.5  0.8  0.7  0.4  0.7  1.0
Rice  0.8  0.5  0.8  0.7  0.4  0.7  1.0  1.0
ITALY
Bread  Beef  Sugar  Coffee  Fuel  Gasoline  Rice
Bread  1.0
Beef  0.8  1.0
Sugar  0.6  0.4  1.0
Coffee  0.8  0.6  0.5  1.0
Fuel  0.0  0.0  -0.4  0.0  1.0
Gasoline  0.0  -0.2  0.2  0.3  0.2  1.0
Rice  0.9  0.7  0.7  0.6  -0.2  -0.2  1.0
GERMANY
Bread  Sugar  Fuel  Gasoline  Coffee  Beef
Bread  1.0
Sugar  0.1  1.0
Fuel  0.0  0.2  1.0
Gasoline  -0.2  0.3  0.8  1.0
Coffee  -0.2  0.3  0.4  0.6  1.0
Beef  0.3  -0.1  0.1  -0.1  -0.1  1.0
FRANCE
Bread  Beef  Rice  Sugar  Coffee  Gasoline  Fuel
Bread  1.0
Beef  0.7  1.0
Rice  0.7  0.8  1.0
Sugar  0.5  0.4  0.6  1.0
Coffee  -0.1  0.3  0.4  0.4  1.0
Gasoline  -0.2  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.8  1.0
Fuel  0.1  0.3  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.9  1.0
CANADA
Beef  Bread  Rice  Sugar  Coffee  Fuel  Gasoline
Beef  1.0
Bread  0.8  1.0
Rice  0.8  0.9  1.0
Sugar  0.6  0.7  0.8  1.0
Coffee  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.6  1.0
Fuel  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.7  1.0
Gasoline  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.3  0.5  0.6  1.0
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